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This dissertation seeks to critically examine the restraint of trade doctrine in South African 
law. Section 22 of the Constitution, 1996 guarantees every citizen the right to not only choose 
a trade, profession, or occupation, but also to practise them. However, in terms of section 36 
of the Constitution, the rights in the Bill of Rights are not absolute. Restraint of trade 
provisions are incorporated into an employee’s employment contract by the employer, and 
has the effect of limiting the employee’s free exercise of his/her chosen trade, or profession. 
An employee who is bound by a restraint of trade cannot compete with his/her employer 
during the employment relationship and after its termination. The dissertation will explore the 
enforceability of restraint of provisions in South African law by tracing its history of 
enforceability in South African law, defining a restraint of trade provision and discovering 
the reason why such a provision exists, the implications of its incorporation, its status in 
employment law, as well as contentious issues which arise in respect of such a provision. The 
dissertation also articulates the requirements which must be met in order for a restraint of 
trade provision to be upheld by the courts, and the current law on restraint of trade. Garden 
leave clauses have not been considered by South African courts before February 2016. 
Garden leave primarily originated from English law and employers, especially in the 
financial sector have been incorporating them into their employees’ employment contracts. 
This dissertation will investigate the new concept of garden leave in South African law, by 
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A contract is an agreement that gives rise to obligations which are enforced or recognised by 
law.1 A valid contract comes into existence upon agreement of the contractual terms by the 
contracting parties,2 and results in the protection of the incorporated contractual terms.3 It is 
generally accepted that the agreed upon contractual terms should be honoured, unless they are 
contrary to the law, morality, public policy or public interest.4 Public policy requires that 
contracts which are voluntarily entered into by persons in possession of the requisite capacity 
and understanding be held sacred, and that those persons have the utmost liberty of 
contracting.5 The obligation to respect confidential information which is imparted or received 
in confidence arises when a fiduciary relationship is based on a contract, and is implied by 
law as a term of a contract.6 
Mankind is a social species with an instinct for meaningful association, and their self-esteem 
and self-worth is bound with being accepted as socially useful.7‘Everyone has inherent 
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.’8 This is a constitutionally 
guaranteed right that is afforded to all persons. Human dignity comprises of the freedom to 
choose a vocation, and the freedom to work even when it is not required for survival.9 An 
individual’s work forms part of his/her identity, and constitutes his/her dignity.10 Every 
person has the right to engage in any activity which he believes can be undertaken as a 
profession, and to make that activity the very essence of his/her life.11 The foundation of a 
                                                          
1M van Jaarsveld ‘The validity of a restraint of trade clause in an employment contract’ (2003) 15(3) SA Merc 
LJ 327. 
2Ibid 326. 
3Ibid (note 1 above). 
4Ibid (note 2 above). 
5Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462, 465. 
6Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter and Another 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 426H-I. 
7Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka 2004 (2) BCLR 120 (SCA) para 27. 
8Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
9Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) para 59. See 
also Minister of Home Affairs (note 7 above). 





person’s existence comprises of work and human personality.12 A relationship exists between 
the two, and it shapes and completes a person over a lifetime of dedicated activity.13 
The Constitution14guarantees every South African citizen the right to trade freely.Section 22 
of the Constitution provides that ‘every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation 
or profession freely.’ The section comprises of not only the right to choose a trade, 
occupation or profession, but also the right to practise the chosen trade, occupation or 
profession freely.15 The essence of the right is the freedom to earn a living by engaging in a 
trade, occupation or profession,16 and emphasis is placed on the freedom to work.17 
Section 26 of the interimConstitution18 provided that every person had the right to engage in 
economic activity and pursue a livelihood.  The wording of section 22 is narrower than that 
of section 26, because section 22 provides the right to every citizen, whilst section 26 
provided the right to every person. The reason for this difference is that the final Constitution 
seeks to address past discriminatory practices which restricted the rights of some individuals 
to choose their livelihoods.19 
As a result of section 22 of the Constitution, every citizen is entitled to freely exercise his/her 
trade, profession or calling in competition with others. However, the rights contained in the 
Constitution are not absolute, as they are subject to limitations in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution, and consequently have to be balanced with other protected rights and interests.20 
This is because the exercise of an individual’s right may be limited by another person’s 
exercise of his own fundamental right.21 Therefore, although every citizen is constitutionally 
entitled to freely exercise his/her trade, profession or calling in competition with others, this 
right is not unfettered.22 It must be exercised in a way which does not trespass upon the rights 
of others,23 and a balance must be struck between the parties’ obligation to honour the 
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa1996. 
15J Neethling ‘The constitutional impact on the burden of proof in restraint of trade covenants-a need for 
exercising restraint’ (2008) 20(1) SA Merc LJ 91. 
16 K Calitz ‘Restraint of trade agreements in employment contracts: time for pacta sunt servanda to bow out?’ 
(2011) 22(1) Stellenbosch LR 63. 
17 Ibid. 
18Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
19T Dooka ‘The restraint of trade clause’ (1999) 7(4) JBL 137. 
20 Ibid. 
21Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 486 (SCA) para 12. 
22Document Warehouse (Pty) Limited v Truebody and Another (2010 /26977) [2010] ZAGPJHC 92 (13 October 
2010) para 18. 




agreements entered into between them and the right of the individual to trade and to practice 
his chosen profession freely.24 The individual should be held to the terms of a fair, 
enforceable and reasonable restraint agreement which he had voluntarily entered into.25 In 
determining whether there has been an unconstitutional limitation of a right, the purpose of 
the limitation has to be considered together with all the factors listed in s 36(1).26 This may 
occur when the enforceability of restraint of trade agreements and the balancing or 
reconciling of public and private interest are considered.27 
The following sections of the Constitution should be taken into consideration when section 
22 is interpreted: section 10(the right to human dignity); section 13(the right to not be 
subjected to forced labour); section 18(the right to freedom of association); section 21(the 
right to freedom of movement); and section 23(the right to fair labour practices). 
As a result of section 22 of the Constitution, every citizen is entitled to freely exercise his/her 
trade, profession or calling in competition with others. However, the rights contained in the 
Constitution are not absolute, as they are subject to limitations in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution, and consequently have to be balanced with other protected rights and interests.28 
This is because the exercise of an individual’s right may be limited by another person’s 
exercise of his/her own fundamental right.29 Therefore, although every citizen is 
constitutionally entitled to freely exercise his/her trade, profession or calling in competition 
with others, this right is not unfettered.30 It must be exercised in a way which does not 
trespass upon the rights of others,31 and a balance must be struck between the parties’ 
obligation to honour the agreements entered into between them and the right of the individual 
to trade and to practice his/her chosen profession freely.32 The individual should be held to 
the terms of a fair, enforceable and reasonable restraint agreement which he/she had 
voluntarily entered into.33 In determining whether there has been an unconstitutional 
                                                          
24Document Warehouse (note 22 above). 
25Ibid para 54. 




30Document Warehouse (note 24 above). 
31Waste Products Utilisation (note 23 above). 
32Document Warehouse (note 30 above). 




limitation of a right, the purpose of the limitation has to be considered together with all the 
factors listed in s 36(1).34 
2 BACKGROUND 
In the field of individual labour law, the parties to an employment contract are the employer 
and employee.35 An employment contract creates the relationship between the employer and 
employee,36 states the employee’s obligations,37 and gives rise to a fiduciary relationship 
between the two parties.38 This relationship of trust signifies that an employee cannot disclose 
trade secrets or confidential information which belongs to the employer to outsiders or 
competitors.39 An employer is entitled to dismiss the employee for breach of this duty.40  An 
employee who assists a former employee, in obtaining trade secrets so that both parties can 
operate in competition with their common employer to obtain business is a serious violation 
of the employee's obligations to his employer, and warrants dismissal.41 
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, an employee owes the employer a duty of 
good faith.42This duty entails that the employee must devote his energy, skills and normal 
working hours to further and enhance his employer’s business interests.43Consequently, an 
employee is obliged to not: 
i. work against the employer’s interests;44 
ii. without the knowledge of his employer acquire any interests or benefits through his 
employment;45 
iii. place himself in a position where his interests will conflict with those of the employer; 
that is not to involve himself in undertakings which are in competition with his 
employer;46 
iv. make a secret profit at the employer’s expense;47 and  
                                                          
34Reddy (note 26 above). 
35T Dooka (note 19 above) 135.  
36 M van Jaarsveld (note 4 above). 
37Waste Products Utilisation (note 23 above) 571J. 
38Ibid 572F. See also J Grogan Workplace Law 10 ed (2009) 49. 
39 S R van Jaarsveld, J D Fourie &  M P Olivier in W A Joubert (founding ed) The Law of South Africa vol 
13(1) First Reissue (2001) para 219. 
40 Ibid. 
41National Union of Metalworkers of SA on behalf of Adams and Peter Bresler & Associates t/a Magnador 2011 
(32) ILJ 514 (BCA) para 16. 
42Ganes & anotherv Telecom Namibia Ltd 2004 (3) SA 615 (SCA) para 25. 
43 J Grogan (note 38 above). See also Wespro (Cape Town) vStephenson 1995(4) BLLR 86 (IC) 90. 
44Ganes (note 42 above). 
45 J Grogan (note 43 above). 




v. receive from a third party a bribe, secret profit or commission in the course of or by 
means of his position as an employee.48 
The employee’s duty to act in good faith borders on a fiduciary duty.49 When an employee 
secretly competes with his employer’s business for his own account, he breaches his fiduciary 
duty.50 
The employer can claim from the employee any bribe, secret profit or commission received 
by him from a third party without the consent of his employer in the course of his 
employment or by means of his position as an employee.51 Bribes or secret commissions 
which are received by an employee in the course of his employment or by means of his 
employment in breach of his fiduciary duty to the employer are deemed to have been 
received for his employer.52 
An employee may not work for another employer, if the latter’s business interests’ conflict 
with those of the employee’s principal employer.53 However, in the absence of a contrary 
provision in the employment contract, an employee may work two compatible jobs, provided 
that the second job is not conducted during the working hours that the employee is obliged to 
work for the principal employer.54 Furthermore, in the absence of a special legal restriction, 
an employee is entitled to the free exercise of his trade, profession or calling unless he has 
bound himself to the contrary.55 Therefore, an employee can freely compete with his former 
employer upon his resignation, provided that he is not subject to a restraint of trade 
agreement.56 
In the absence of any express terms in the employment contract, the employee’s obligations 
with respect to the use and disclosure of information are subject to implied terms.57 Implied 
terms arise out of the common law, statute or trade usage, and are used to describe an 
unexpressed provision of the contract which the law introduces without reference to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
47Ganes (note 46 above). 
48 Ibid. 
49Wespro( note 43 above) 93. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52Ganes (note 42 above) para 29. 
53 J Grogan (note 45 above). 
54Ibid 50. 
55Waste Products (note 23 above) 570H. 
56 J Grogan (note 54 above). 




parties’ actual intention.58 An implied term is introduced into a written contract as a matter of 
law, and is a part of the naturalia of the contract.59An employee, who is, by virtue of his 
employment able to exploit for his own benefit his employer’s customer connections is free 
on leaving his employment, subject to certain limitations to compete with his former 
employer for the latter’s business customers except where he is restrained by contract from 
doing so.60 
When a fiduciary relationship is based on an employment contract, the obligation to respect 
the confidentiality of information imparted or received in confidence is, whether expressly 
provided for or not, an inherent requirement61 and generally regarded as a term of the contract 
implied by law.62 This implied term is subject to any different provisions agreed upon by the 
parties, and content of which must be determined in light of the contract as a whole.63 Section 
22 of the Constitution provides that ‘the practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be 
regulated by law.’It has been held by the courts that an employee may not make use of nor 
disclose trade secrets or confidential information which was gained in the course of his 
employment, and which belongs to the employer to outsiders or competitors in any way 
which is inconsistent with the employer’s business interests.64 The employer is entitled to 
dismiss an employee for breach of this duty.65 One of the forms of unlawful competition is 
the misuse of confidential information in order to advance one’s own business interests.66 
Although it is an inevitable consequence of the employment relationship that the employer 
may disclose confidential information to his employees during the existence of the 
employment relationship,67 an employer may desire to protect his business from competition, 
and business information, trade secrets or connections from possible exploitation in the event 
of the termination of the employee’s employment contract.68 This desire is expressed as a 
                                                          
58Vox Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd v Steyn & another 2016 (37) ILJ 1255 (LC) para 41. 
59 Ibid. 
60Reeves and Another v Marfield Insurance Brokers CC and Another 1996 (3) SA 766 (A) 772D-E. 
61C Todd and T Laubscher Contracts of Employment 2ed(2008) 113. 
62Waste Products (note 38 above). 
63Ibid 572G. 
64Wespro (note 43 above). 
65 S R van Jaarsveld (note 39 above). 
66Waste Products (note 23 above) 571F-G. 
67C Todd (note 61 above) 112. 




restraint of trade clause which is incorporated into the employment contract as a contractual 
term, and is binding after the employment contract has terminated.69 
In South Africa’s growing economy, disputes’ surrounding the enforceability of restraint of 
trade clauses is a fertile ground for litigation, both for employers and employees.70 A restraint 
of trade goes beyond the mere protection of confidential information.71 It focuses on the 
employee’s right to exercise his chosen trade, occupation or profession freely,72 and operates 
once the employment relationship between the employer and employee has terminated.73 
Employers enter into restraint of trade agreements with their employees so that they would 
not have to place reliance on the employee’s honesty in policing the rights which the 
employer seeks to protect.74 Restraint of trade clauses can also restrain both parties to a 
contract,75 and an employee cannot be compelled by his employer to sign a restraint of trade 
agreement after he has entered service.76 A dispute which relates to a restraint of trade is a 
matter which concerns a contract of employment in terms of section 77(3) of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997.77 
3CONCLUSION 
While section 22 of the Constitution provides every citizen with the right to choose and 
practise their profession, trade or occupation freely, this right is not unfettered as the rights in 
the Bill of Rights may be limited by section 36 of the Constitution. Furthermore, section 22 
further provides that the practice of a trade, profession or occupation may be regulated by 
law. This law is the law on restraint of trade. 
4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
i. What is the definition of a restraint of trade? 
ii. Why does such a provision exist? 
iii. What are the implications of such a provision being incorporated into an employment 
contract? 
                                                          
69Ibid (note 4 above). 
70Document Warehouse (note 22 above) para 1 
71 C Todd (note 61 above). 
72 J Neethling (note 15 above). 
73 T Dooka (note 35 above). 
74Document Warehouse (note 22 above) para 50.  
75 AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 204. 
76Grogan (note 56 above). 
77Singh v Adam 2006 (27) ILJ 385 (LC) para 16.See also Labournet Holdings (Pty) Ltd v McDermott & Another 




iv. What is the status of such a provision in employment law? 
v. What impact does such a provision have on an unfair dismissal? 
vi. What are the contentious issues that arise in respect of such a provision? 
vii. What is the current position on restraint of trade in South African law? 
5 RATIONALE FOR STUDY 
The Labour Court recently considered the effect of a garden leave provision on the 
enforceability of a restraint of trade. Garden leave provisions had not been considered by 
South African courts before February 2016. The concept of garden leave primarily originates 
from English law, and forms part of an employee’s employment contract. Employers, 
especially in the financial sector have been increasingly incorporating garden leave clauses 
into their employees’ contracts. In terms of this provision, the employer may elect to pay the 
employee in lieu of the employee not performing his/her duties for the duration of the notice 
period; however during this period the employee must remain accessible to the employer.  
6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Information for this dissertation has been gathered from case law; legislation; journal articles; 
and textbooks. 
7PURPOSE OF WORK 
The recent case ofVodacom(Pty) Ltd v Motsa and Another 78 brought into focus restraint of 
trade provisions, and introduced a new concept of garden leave provisions into South African 
labour law. This work will focus on the South African law of restraint of trade, and the new 
concept of garden leave provisions. 
8OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter two will focus on restraint of trade provisions. The definition, nature and impact of 
restraint of trade clauses will be explored. Additionally, the requirements for the 
enforceability of these clauses will also be discussed. 
                                                          




Chapter three will discuss the courts’ approach in adjudicating matters relating to restraint of 
trade prior to the landmark case of Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis,79 as 
well as the judgment which was handed down in Magna Alloys. 
Chapter four will focus ongarden leave provisions, as they are a new aspect of restraint of 
trade which has not been considered by South African courts prior to February 2016. The 


















                                                          
791984 (4) SA 874 (A). Hereafter referred to as Magna Alloys.  





2 CHAPTER TWO 
In this chapter, the definition, nature and impact of restraint of trade clauses will be explored. 
Additionally, the requirements for the enforceability of these clauses will also be discussed. 
1 INTRODUCTION  
Restraint of trade agreements are enforceable, except where the court can be convinced as to 
their unenforceability.81 This is because the landmark decision of the Appellate Division (as it 
was known then) in Magna Alloys introduced a significant change to the South African 
courts’ approach to restraint of trade agreements.82 The court refused to follow earlier 
decisions which were based in English law that a restraint of trade agreement was prima 
faciecontrary to public policy, and thus invalid and unenforceable.83 The party who sought to 
enforce the agreement had to show that the restraint was reasonable between the parties, 
while the onus of proving that it was contrary to public policy rested on the party alleging it.84 
The court overturned this approach and held that restraint of trade agreements are valid and 
enforceable, unless they were unreasonable and therefore contrary to public policy.85 This 
finding was the greatest contribution of the case to South African law on restraint of trade.  
As a consequence of the restraint agreements’ common-law validity, a party who challenges 
the enforceability of the agreements bears the burden of alleging so and proving that it is 
unreasonable.86 It was also held that the enforceability of a restraint was dependent on 
whether enforcing it would be contrary to the public interest to do so.87 This was to be 
assessed in light of the circumstances which had prevailed when it was sought to enforce the 
restraint and involved the weighing up of two main considerations.88 The first is that the 
public interest generally requires that parties should comply with their contractual 
obligations, even if they are unreasonable or unfair. The second consideration is that all 
                                                          
81R Marcus ‘Contracts in restraint of trade’ (1994) 2(1) JBL 33. See also Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Jordaan 
& Another 2013 (34) ILJ 2105 (LC) para 20. 
82Reddy (note 21 above) para 10. 
83Ibid. See also Reeves (note 60 above) 775H-J; Dd Tladi ‘Breathing constitutional values into the law of 
contract: freedom of contract and the constitution’ (2002) 2(35) De Jure 313.  
84Reddy (note 83 above). 
85Ibid. See also Shoprite Checkers (note 81 above); Jonsson Workwear (Pty) Ltd v Williamson & Another 2014 
(35) ILJ 712 (LC) para 41. 
86Reddy (note 84 above). 





persons should, in the interests of society, be permitted as far as possible to engage in 
commerce or the professions.89 
All agreements, including restraint of trade agreements are subject to constitutional rights 
obliging the courts to consider fundamental constitutional values when applying and 
developing the law of contract in accordance with the Constitution.90 Section 8 of the 
Constitution is vital.91 Section 39(2) of the Constitution requires that a court when 
interpreting and developing the common law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights.92 
Clauses restraining trade have drawn significant attention from the courts because of the 
interplay between the principles and objects of labour law and contract law.93 In order to 
determine if labour law and contract law can be reconciled, especially in instances where the 
employer has perpetuated an unfair labour practice and then seeks the enforcement of the  
restraint of trade provision, the constitutional right to fair labour practices and whether the 
right creates an implied contractual right to fair dealings need to be examined.94 
Restraint of trade clauses are onerous in nature because they curtail commercial activity and 
hold grave consequences for the covenanter.95 The consequence of such a clause is that a 
former employee’s free exercise of his chosen trade, occupation or profession is restricted.96 
The legitimate object of the clause is to protect the employer’s goodwill, customer 
connections and trade secrets, and remains effective for a specified period after the 
employment relationship has ended.97 Therefore, the former employee is not only after the 
termination of his employment contract restrained from using or disclosing confidential 
information belonging to the employer,98 but is also prohibited from exercising his trade, 
                                                          
89Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling and Others 1990 (4) SA 782 (A) 794C-D. 
90Reddy (note 21 above) para 11. 
91 Ibid. 
Section 8(3) (a)(b) of the Constitution provides that when applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural 
or juristic person the court must apply or where necessary develop the common law to the extent that the 
legislation does not give effect to that right and may develop the common law rules to limit the right, provided 
that the limitation is in accordance with section 36 of the Constitution. 
92 Ibid. 
93 P van der Merwe ‘When a restraint of trade isn’t fair’ (2015) 15(10) Without Prejudice 18. 
94 Ibid. 
95 C-J Pretorius ‘Covenants in restraint of trade: a synthesis of traditional, common law and constitutional 
approaches’ (2009) 30(1) Obiter 154. 
96 J Neethling (note 72 above). 
97Reeves (note 60 above) 772F.See also Bonfiglioli SA (Pty) Ltd v Panaino 2015 (36) ILJ 947 (LAC) para 23. 
98 K Kemp ‘The significance of consideration paid for post-employment restraints in England and Germany’ 




occupation or profession, and engaging in the same business venture as the employer for a 
specified period in a specified area.99 
Key or skilled employees particularly, are customarily bound by restraint of trade clauses.100 
These clauses are significant in high-tech industries where it may be difficult to prove that an 
employee, when working for a competitor is making use of his former employer’s trade 
secrets for the competitor’s advantage.101For employers they are a vital weapon, especially in 
a post-recession era where there is fierce competition for work, and where competitors can 
get access to the employer’s confidential information.102 
Additionally, these clauses give effect to the employer’s right to protect his business and 
ensure that the employer’s business is protected against an employee or former employee 
during the subsistence of the employment relationship or after its termination.103 An 
employer’s legitimate interests which are not automatically protected under the general law 
of a country are also safeguarded.104 The employer is not required to cross its fingers and 
hope that the employee will not disclose its confidential information to his new employer,105 
and the employer cannot also police the employee’s undertaking that he will not disclose 
confidential information to his new employer.106  Therefore, the employer ‘need not wait 
until the horse has bolted’107 to seek a remedy against the employee.108 Due to the provision’s 
existence, employers are relieved of the burden of proving the actual use or disclosure of 
confidential information.109 
The use of restraint of trade clauses in employment contracts reduce employee turnover rates, 
and encourage the investment of valuable information, while minimising society’s cost of 
securing such investment.110 These claims are based on the assumption that the labour market 
is perfectly competitive, and that employees are perfectly informed about future employment 
opportunities and their value.111 However, employees frequently have insufficient 
                                                          
99 M van Jaarsveld (note 68 above). 
100 R Marcus (note 81 above). 
101C Todd (note 61 above) 114. 
102L Frahm-Arp ‘Restraints of trade’ (2013) 13(9) Without Prejudice 51. 
103 M van Jaarsveld (note 99 above). 
104K Kemp (note 98 above) 258. 
105Document Warehouse (note 22 above) para 49. 
106Ibid (note 74 above). 
107 K Kemp (note 98 above). 
108Ibid.See also Shoprite Checkers (note 81 above) para 42. 
109Ibid (note 98 above). 





information regarding the effect, value, and existence of a restraint of trade clause.112As a 
result, an employee who is bound by a restraint of trade provision cannot:  
i. compete with his employer during the employment relationship and after its 
termination;113 
ii. be employed by a competing employer during the employment relationship and after 
its termination;114 and 
iii. entice his former employer’s employees away from his former employer;115 and 
persuade the former employer’s clients or suppliers’ to stop their business with the 
former employer, or move their business to a new employer.116 
In labour law litigation, it is not uncommon for matters to be heard on an urgent basis despite 
the effective date having come and gone.117 Courts have heard urgent restraint of trade 
applications where a significant portion of the restraint period had already lapsed,118 because 
of the time that it takes to enrol an opposed motion in court.119 Furthermore, if the matter is to 
be placed on the opposed motion roll in the ordinary course, the restraint of trade sought 
would have run its entire course.120An alleged breach of a restraint of trade is by its nature 
urgent.121If the breach and reasonableness of the restraint is proved, the harm that is caused 
by the breach will continue.122 If relief is sought in the form of an interim interdict, which 
would endure for the entire unexpired period of the restraint, it should be treated as a final 
relief application.123 
The requirements for a final order are a: 
i. clear right; 
ii. an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; and 
                                                          
112 Ibid. 




117Vox (note 58 above) para 10. 
118 Ibid. 
119Pinnacle Technology Shared Management Services (Pty) Limitedand Another v Venter and 
Another(J1095/15) [2015] ZALCJHB 199 (14 July 2015) para 6. 
120Vox (note 58 above) para 11. 
121 Ibid. 
122Pinnacle Technology (note 119 above). 




iii. absence of any other satisfactory remedy.124 
Where application is made for a final interdict, the application will be decided on the first 
respondent’s version together with the admitted facts in the applicant’s founding affidavit.125 
The facts that are stated in the first respondent’s answering affidavit are to be accepted by the 
court unless the first respondent’s versions are so far-fetched or evidently flawed that the 
court will be justified in rejecting the version merely on the papers.126 This was the rule 
which was laid down by the court in Plascon-Evans Paints LtdvVan Riebeeck Paints (Pty) 
Ltd 127 
An employer can apply to court to enforce a restraint interdict pending appeal. Section 18 of 
the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 read together with rule 49(11) of the High Court Rules 
provides that an applicant who shows that exceptional circumstances exist, and that it would 
suffer irreparable harm and that respondent would not suffer irreparable harm if the interdict 
is not enforced, the court will order that the interdict be enforced pending appeal.128 
2 ENFORCEABILITY OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE AGREEMENTS 
The Constitution forms the value system against which the dispute between an employer and 
a former employee with regard to the enforcement of a restraint of trade must be resolved.129 
When the enforcement of a restraint of trade is sought, the contractual principles of pacta sunt 
servanada; that is the sanctity of contract and the freedom of trade come into being.130 The 
sanctity of contract principle provides that it is paramount to honour agreements which have 
been entered into, including those which limit the exercise of a trade in future; while the 
freedom of trade principle provides that every individual has the right to engage in economic 
activity without restriction.131 Although both principles are inter-related a tension exists, 
which is linked to the issue of which principle should be given preference when the court 
adjudicates a matter in which the enforcement of a restraint of trade is sought.132These 
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principles are basic to modern society as far as individual interests and public interests are 
concerned.133 
The enforceability of a restraint agreement is dependent on whether the party for whose 
benefit it has been concluded and who seeks its enforcement, has a proprietary interest which 
is justifiable of protection.134 If the restraint does not protect a proprietary interest of the party 
who wishes to enforce it, the dispute will end there.135 Where a proprietary interest is 
protected, the reasonableness of the restraint must be determined.136 Prior to determining if a 
restraint of trade clause is reasonable, it must first be established if the clause in question 
qualifies as a restraint of trade.137 
2.1 Proprietary interest 
Although there is no closed list of proprietary interests which may be protected,138 there are 
two categories of proprietary interests which can be protected by a restraint; namely trade 
connections139 and trade secrets.140 Trade connections are the employer’s relationships with 
customers, potential customers, suppliers and others,141 and are an important aspect of a 
business’s incorporeal property known as goodwill.142 While an employer’s trade connections 
may be unlawful, it does not mean that the lawful trade connections could and should not be 
protected.143Whether information constitutes a trade secret is a question of fact.144Trade 
secrets consist of confidential information which is useful for the carrying on of a business, 
which if disclosed to a competitor could be used by the competitor to gain a relative 
competitive advantage over the employer.145There are specific trade secrets so confidential 
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that, even though they may have been memorised by the employee when he left his 
employment, they cannot lawfully be used for anyone’s benefit but the employer’s.146 
Pricing strategies and manufacturing processes, methods of operations, knowledge of 
business conditions, and customer attachments can also be protected by restraint of trade 
agreements.147 The mere elimination of competition does not justify the enforcement of a 
restraint of trade.148The mere assertion that certain methodologies and processes are 
confidential is insufficient.149 
There are two types of confidential information which enjoy protection: 1) an employer’s 
confidential information to which an employee may have150 access to and which is of such a 
nature that the employee may never use it except for the benefit of the employer and which 
the employee remains bound to keep secret at all times after leaving the employer’s 
employ;151 2) the information of an employer which an employee must guard as confidential 
for as long as he remains in the employ of the employer152 because of his/her general implied 
duty of good faith to his employer153 but which is of such a nature that it is carried away in 
the employee’s head after his employment has ended and which the employee is free to use 
for the benefit of himself or others provided that he has not whilst still employed by that 
employer broken his duty of good faith by making or copying a list of that employer’s 
customers or deliberately memorising that list.154 
Not every piece of information which is obtained by an employee during the course of his 
employment for an employer qualifies as secret or confidential.155  Furthermore, ordinary 
general information about a business does not become confidential because the proprietor 
elects to label it as such.156 An express term requiring confidentiality is not required in an 
employment contract.157 The fact that an application or process may be a very simple solution 
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to a problem and may be self-evident once attention is drawn to it, does not mean that it is not 
protectable as being confidential information or a secret process.158 
2.2 Confidential information 
For information to qualify as confidential, the information in question must meet the 
following three requirements:  
i. it must involve and be capable of application in trade or industry, that is it must be 
useful;  
ii. it must not be public knowledge and public property, that is objectively determined it 
must be known to only a restricted number of people or to a closed circle; and  
iii. objectively determined it must be of economic value to the person seeking to protect 
it.159 
If it is objectively established that a particular piece of information could be reasonably 
useful to a competitor, namely to gain an advantage over the plaintiff,160 such knowledge is 
prima facie confidential between the employee and third parties.161 
The following categories of confidential information can be protected by a restraint of trade: 
i. customer lists which are drawn up by a trader and kept confidential for the trader’s 
business purposes;  
ii. information which is received by an employee in relation to business opportunities 
which are available to the employer;  
iii. information received by the employee in confidence while in the employ of an 
employer remains protected by a legal duty, implied by the employment contract;  
iv. information while being in the public domain is protected as confidential; 
v. when skill and labour has been expended in gathering and compiling the information 
into a useful form, and when the compiler has kept the compilation confidential, or 
has distributed it on a confidential basis;  
vi. information which relates to the marketing of a new product will be confidential if 
such information is the product of skill and labour, and has been kept confidential;  
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vii. information relating to the specifications of a product, and a process of manufacture 
will be confidential if skill and industry has been expended or if they have been kept 
confidential; and  
viii. an individual who is in a fiduciary relationship with a tenderer, and is in possession of 
information relating to the prices which one person has competitively tendered to do 
work for another.162 
The type of information itself does not give rise to its confidentiality.163  What is regarded as 
confidential information depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.164 
However, if the information in question could be objectively and reasonably serviceable or 
useful to a trade competitor, it will be regarded as confidential information between a former 
employer and a former employee.165 
The fact that the employee asserts that he will not disclose any of the confidential information 
or customer connections which he had acquired during its employment to third parties, 
constitutes evidence that the employee has appropriated himself to the details of the 
confidential information and customer connections, and is therefore in a position to disclose 
and use such information to his advantage during his employment with the new employer.166 
Furthermore, where the employee declares and formally undertakes that he will not, in his 
new employment utilise the knowledge which he had gained of the former employer’s 
business to the detriment of the former employer, constitutes a tacit concession by the 
employee that the former employer has proprietary rights which are worthy of protection.167 
2.3 Onus 
It is in very rare instances that the employee and not the employer claims compliance with the 
terms of a restraint of trade.168 The employer bears the onus of invoking the restraint and 
proving its breach.169 The onus of proving that the restraint is unenforceable because it is 
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unreasonable rests on the party seeking to escape the enforcement of the restraint.170 An 
acknowledgement by the employee in a restraint agreement that the restraint is fair, 
reasonable and necessary is not decisive.171 The employee will have to prove on a balance of 
probability that it will be unreasonable to enforce the restraint.172 The employee must provide 
the court with clear and concrete evidence as to why the restraint is unreasonable.173 The 
employee must show that the employer has no protectable interest in the form of trade 
secrets, confidential information, goodwill or trade connections, that the restraint was not 
reasonably necessary to legitimately protect the employer’s protectable proprietary interests 
such as his trade connections and trade secrets, and must prove that at the time that 
enforcement of the restraint was sought, the restraint was solely directed at the restriction of 
fair competition.174 The circumstances which the court will consider cover an extensive field 
and include those relating to the nature, extent and duration of the restraint, and the legitimate 
interest of the parties, as well as the equality or otherwise of the parties’ bargaining 
powers.175 
In order for the employer to be successful in enforcing a restraint, he must have a real and 
substantial interest which is deserving of protection,176 and must establish that its proprietary 
interests; namely its confidential information or trade secrets justify protection under the 
restraint.177 The employer’s interest in enforcing the restraint of trade is to protect its 
confidential information,178 as well as its customer connections, as upon the termination of 
the employee’s employment, the employee may be able to induce the customers with whom 
he had a built a close relationship with to follow him to his new place of employment, due to 
his personal knowledge of and influence that he has over the customers.179 Moreover, it must 
be demonstrated in reasonable clear terms that the information, know-how, technology or 
method in question is unique and peculiar to the employer and is not public knowledge, 
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public property and is more than just trivial.180 The employer must show that the confidential 
information or trade secrets which the employee had received during the course of his 
employment are being or will be used by the employee in a competing business or that an 
obligation not to use them will not be sufficient to protect them.181 The employer must also 
prove that the employee will be able to potentially exploit his confidential information or 
customer connections in his new employment.182 It is sufficient for the employer to create the 
real probability that the employee will consciously or unconsciously do so in his employment 
due to the loyalty he will owe to his new employer.183If the employer has no proprietary 
interests which justify protection under the restraint, the restraint will be regarded as 
unreasonable and contrary to public policy with its intention being to only prevent 
competition.184 
It is not necessary for the court to find that the employee would use his previous employer’s 
trade secrets and confidential information in his new employment, it is sufficient if the 
employee could do so.185 Action cannot be taken against an employee, if a court has ordered 
an employee to disclose trade secrets.186 It was held in Technor (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
Rishworth,187that a restraint which remains effective until the lifetime of a party or for an 
indefinite period may be found to be reasonable, even though it may be so onerous that it 
contravenes public policy.  
Once it is established that the party seeking enforcement of the restraint has a proprietary 
interest which justifies protection, the restraint clause must also satisfy the test for 
reasonableness; that is it must be reasonable between the parties and not contrary to public 
policy.188 The courts will not hesitate to enforce a restraint of trade agreement where the 
terms agreed upon by the parties to the agreement are reasonable and not against public 
policy as public policy requires contracts to be enforced.189 It is imperative that individuals 
are held to the agreements that they enter into.190 Predictability and accountability in 
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commercial activity is a social value which is not to be lightly subordinated to the specious 
claims of ‘freedom’ by rule breakers.191 
2.4 Reasonableness 
In determining the reasonableness of a restraint of trade, a court must make a value 
judgement and consider two principal policy considerations.192 The first is that the public 
interest requires that parties should comply with their contractual obligations.193 This is 
expressed by the pacta sunt servanda maxim.194 The second is that it is in the interests of 
society that all persons should be productive and be permitted to engage in trade and 
commerce or the professions.195 When applying these principal considerations, the court must 
examine the parties’ particular interests.196 A restraint which is reasonable between the 
parties may for some other reason be contrary to the public interest.197 
The aforementioned policy considerations reflect both the common law and constitutional 
values.198 It is not simply a question of deciding by using evidentiary rules what version to 
accept with the result automatically following.199 Forming part of the constitutional value of 
dignity as found in section 10 of the Constitution is contractual autonomy.200 It is by entering 
into contracts that an individual takes part in economic life.201 Therefore, the freedom to 
contract is vital component of the section 22 right of the Constitution.202 Section 22 reflects 
the close relationship between the freedom to choose a vocation and the nature of a society 
that is founded on human dignity as envisioned by the Constitution.203 
The Appellate Division (as it was known then) in Basson v Chilwan204 established the 
following test for reasonableness which has been regarded as one of the most influential 
statements of law:205 
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i. Does one party have an interest which deserves protection at the termination of the 
employment contract? 
ii. If so, is such an interest being prejudiced by the other party? 
iii. If so, does such interest weigh up qualitatively and quantitatively against the interests 
of the other party that the other party should not be economically inactive and 
unproductive?  
iv. Is there another public policy factor which does not have anything to do with the 
relationship between the parties which requires that the restraint either be enforced or 
disallowed?206 
A fifth question to the enquiry was added byKwik Kopy (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Van Haarlem and 
another,207 namely whether the restraint is wider than what is necessary to protect the 
protectable interest.208 The usefulness of the information and the prospect of it being 
diminished is also considered as well as whether the employee has a prospect of relocating 
and establishing himself in any another industry and becoming gainfully employed.209 
Additionally, the circumstances which caused the wrongful termination of the employee’s 
employment should be taken into account, as a restraint of trade agreement can be enforced 
even where there has been the wrongful termination of the employee’s employment 
contract.210 The enquiry undertaken is an extensive one and factors such as the nature, extent 
and duration of the restraint; the area in which the restraint applies; the proprietary interests 
of the former employer; whether the former employee has the ability to earn a living, as well 
as factors peculiar to the parties and their bargaining powers and interests are taken into 
account at the time of the enforcement of the restraint.211 
The common law approach of balancing or reconciling the parties’ interests gives effect to s 
36(1) of the Constitution.212 A restraint of trade agreement is concluded in terms of the law of 
general application as referred to s 36(1) of the Constitution.213 In terms of restraint of trade 
agreements, the law of general application consists of the law of contract, which permits 
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contractual freedom and the conclusion of agreements.214 The four questions listed by the 
court in Basson reflect the questions posed by s 36(1) of the Constitution.215 The fifth 
enquiry, that is whether the restraint goes further than necessary to protect the interest 
corresponds with s 36(1) (e) of the Constitution.216 The value judgement required by Basson 
determines whether the restraint is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.217 
An agreement which unreasonably restrains an employee’s freedom of trade will not be 
enforced.218 An unreasonable restraint is one which is prejudicial to public policy, the 
enforcement of which will be contrary to the public interest.219 The test that is applied; is 
having regard to all the circumstances, does the restraint go further than is reasonably 
necessary to protect the employer’s interests220 In Magna Alloys  it was held that the only 
criterion for unenforceability is prejudice to the public interest. But no indication was 
provided as to what would render a restraint prejudicial to the public interest.221 It was 
suggested in Basson that in order to determine if a restraint is contrary to public policy, the 
facts of a case must be looked at. In Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frobling& others222 it was 
held that the public interest requires that parties should comply with their contractual 
obligations regardless of how unfair they may be, and all persons should be permitted to 
engage in commerce. In Knox D’ Arcy Ltd & Another v Shaw & Another223  the court held 
that where a restraint is so unreasonable that the court’s protection is required, the restrained 
party’s right to engage in economic activity is protected, despite him/her agreeing to the 
restraint of trade.224 Where the public interest is harmed, a restraint of trade clause would be 
unenforceable even if it is found to be reasonable between the parties.225 A restraint of trade 
will be contrary to the public interest if there is no real threat to the employer’s proprietary 
interest, the period of the restraint is unreasonably long in relation to the interests that the 
employer is seeking to protect, or the geographic area in which the restraint applies is 
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unreasonably wide in relation to the interests that need protection.226 Other factors that should 
also be considered include the nature, extent and duration of the restraint.227 
Employees are not regularly in possession of unique formulae, methods or designs.228 They 
only acquire specialised skills which form part of their general knowledge and skills.229 
Hence, while an employee can be restrained from the use or disclosure of confidential 
information which was imparted to or received by him during the course of his employment, 
an employee who utilises his own expertise, knowledge, skill and experience for the benefit 
of his new employer cannot be restrained by means of a restraint of trade contract.230  
Therefore, an employee may use the general skills and knowledge which he acquired during 
his former employment, even where his new employer may benefit from his knowledge and 
skills.231 This is because the employee’s skills and abilities are a part of himself or an 
attribute of himself232 and therefore, he cannot ordinarily be restrained from utilising his 
skills and abilities.233 
Despite an employer having an interest in retaining the services of an employee who has been 
trained in an established field of work through the employer’s expense, and the employee 
gains knowledge and skills in the public domain which he might not have otherwise gained, 
such an interest does not constitute to be the employer’s property.234 The employer has no 
proprietary interest in the employee, his know-how or skills.235 This is because, the know-
how and skills in the public domain which the employee gains through the training becomes a 
part of him, and does not in any way belong to the employer.236 Therefore, the employee’s 
use of his skills and know-how cannot be restrained by way of a restraint of trade clause. 
However, the employee’s seniority is an important consideration,237 and it can be difficult to 
distinguish if an employee has breached the former employer’s right, when he uses his 
                                                          
226Reddy (note 203 above).  
227 T Dooka (note 224 above). 
228 L Frahm-Arp (note 149 above). 
229 Ibid. 
230Dickinson Holdings (note 138 above) para 36. See also FMW Admin Services CC v Stander & Others (2015) 
36 ILJ 1051 (LC) para 38. 
231 J Grogan (note 76 above). 
232Reddy (note 21 above) para 18. See also Arrow Altech (note 123 above) para 66. 
233Dickinson Holdings (note 138 above) para 37. 
234 Ibid. 
235Ibid. See also Reddy (note 232 above).  
236Dickinson Holdings (note 235 above) 




knowledge and skills.238 The courts have shown sympathy towards employers’ rights to trade 
secrets.239 
The employer can request the court to not only protect what it regards as confidential 
information being passed on to a competitor by a former employee, but also to prevent the 
employee from working for a competitor.240 This is because; experience has shown that it is 
not sufficient to incorporate a provision in an employment contract against the disclosure of 
confidential information, as it is firstly difficult to clearly categorise information which is to 
be regarded as confidential and information which is not, and secondly it is very difficult to 
prove a breach of the provision where the information is of such a nature that the employee 
can memorise.241 As a result of these difficulties, the practical solution would be to prevent 
the employee from being employed by a competitor for a short period of time.242 
2.5 Remedies 
The remedies for the misuse of confidential information are an interdict and/or a claim for 
damages.243 An interdict is a drastic and extraordinary remedy which is granted at the 
discretion of the court.244 To succeed the following must be established:  
i. the plaintiff must have an interest in the confidential information and he/she need not 
be the owner of such information;245 
ii. the information must be of a confidential nature.246 A relationship must exist between 
the parties, which imposes a duty on the defendant to preserve the confidence of the 
information imparted to him/her. The most common form of relationship imposing 
such a duty is that between the employer and employee;247 
iii. the defendant must have knowingly appropriated the plaintiff’s confidential 
information;248 
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iv. the defendant must be in improper possession or have made improper use of the 
information, whether as a springboard or otherwise to obtain an unfair advantage for 
himself; and 
v. the plaintiff must have suffered damage as a result.249 
The owner of confidential information has a right to prevent its use by anyone else.250 
However, the right to protect confidential information is not confined to the owner as the 
person who is in lawful possession of the confidential information is also entitled to protect 
the information.251 The wrong which is committed is the unlawful infringement of a 
competitor’s right to be protected from unlawful competition.252 
Spring boarding may constitute the unlawful use of confidential information and the use of 
that information253 to gain a springboard in order to compete.254 Spring boarding entails using 
the fruits of someone else’s labour as the starting point, and not starting at the beginning in 
developing a technique, process, piece of equipment or product.255 In terms of the 
springboard doctrine, an interdict against the use of confidential information may be limited 
by the duration of the advantage obtained or the time saved, by reason of having had access 
to the confidential information.256 However, the interdict may not be limited in time where 
the confidential information sought to be protected is a trade secret.257 Evidence of damages 
must be present for the grant of the relief of damages.258 
The allegation that, as a result of the area and duration of the restraint being unreasonable the 
employee is prevented from exercising his qualifications and skills for the duration of the 
restraint in the area that it operates, must be supported by admissible evidence,259 which is 
unambiguous and substantial in nature.260 For instance, the employee can put before the court 
the steps that he has taken to secure alternative employment, and the unsuccessful results 
which accrued.261 Moreover, a court will look at the industry in which the employer trades, as 
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well as the qualifications, experience and skills of the employee.262 In determining the 
employee’s potential to find employment within the fields which require his/her skills and 
experience if the restraint in question is enforced, the size of the market in which the 
employee may utilise his skills, is considered.263 If the industry in question is an international 
one, and not only limited to South Africa, the court would find it difficult to accept that the 
employee cannot be employed.264 In considering whether the area of the restraint is 
reasonable, the court will look at whether or not it is necessary to protect a legitimate interest 
of the employer.265 The willingness of the employer to reduce the period of the restraint has 
no impact on the enforceability of the restraint.266 
2.6 Other aspects relating to restraint of trade 
When the wrongful termination of an employee by the employer is fraudulent, courts will on 
that ground alone refuse to enforce the restraint.267 An express provision in terms of which 
one contracting party undertakes to condone or submit to the fraudulent conduct of the other 
will be regarded as contra bones mores and offensive to the interests of society to the extent 
that it will be rendered illegal and void.268 A provision which expressly permits a restraint to 
be invoked by such conduct will be regarded as contra bones mores.269 A provision which is 
stated in language wide enough to confer a benefit on a party resulting from his own fraud or 
wilful wrongdoing will not be enforceable to the extent that it does so.270 
The circumstances of, and reasons as to why the employment relationship between the 
employer and employee has terminated is generally irrelevant to the operation of the restraint 
of trade even where the termination occurred as a result of a breach by the employer, because 
the employer’s need for protection of its proprietary interests is independent from the manner 
in which the employment contract is terminated.271 Such a breach may be committed in good 
faith and may be of a technical nature only, or there may be fault on the part of the employer 
and employee.272 Where the breach on the part of the employer is less than innocent, the 
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employee is free to pursue his contractual or statutory remedies against the employer.273 
Where provision has been made in the employment contract for the giving of notice, the 
damage suffered by the employee may not amount to much, however the loss which is 
suffered by the employer as a result of the restraint being held invalid may be considerable.274 
An employee may have his damages assessed on the basis of the existence of the restraint.275 
Where the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995276 provides protection to an employee, an 
implied term of fairness over and above that protection is not included in the employment 
contract.277 Therefore, the courts are not obliged to develop the common law by simply 
incorporating a constitutional right into an employment contract.278 An employee who raises 
the defence of an unfair dismissal in order to avoid the enforcement of the restraint of trade 
provision would need to show that the enforcement of the restraint is reciprocal to the 
employer’s obligation to act fairly.279 An employee can also as an alternative defence claim 
for cancellation of the employment contract by the employer.280 This will occur where the 
employer repudiates the employment contract without any proper reason or gives insufficient 
notice of the termination of an employment contract which is continuing in nature.281 While 
employers are obliged to deal fairly with their employees, this obligation is based in labour 
law and not the law of contract. Therefore, an employee who seeks to evade the enforcement 
of a restraint of trade on the basis of an unfair dismissal must seek the alternative remedies 
that are provided of in the Act.282 When these remedies are ignored, the separate field of 
labour law and the law of contract are muddled.283 Therefore, an employee who is aggrieved 
by the termination of the employment contract is free to pursue his/her statutory remedies for 
unfair dismissal in terms of the Act and not in terms of contractual remedies and the law of 
contract. 
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The controversial issue that had risen was who bore the onus of proving that the restraint in 
question is not contrary to public policy.284 In the case of Magna Alloys the court held that the 
party who alleged that he is not bound by the restraint of trade in question bore the burden of 
proving that the enforcement of the restraint of trade was contrary to public policy.285 
However, the decision of the court in Canon  KwaZulu-Natal  (Pty) Ltd  t/a Canon Office 
Automation v Booth & Another286not only altered the burden of proof in restraint of trade 
agreements, but also provided a good illustration of the doctrine of stare decisis ( the courts 
have to abide by decided cases).287  In Canon the court questioned whether this position was 
in conflict with section 22 of the Constitution, which provides that every person has the right 
to choose their trade, occupation of profession freely.288 The court in Canon289 held that 
although, the court’s decision in Magna Alloys was an Appellant Division decision, thereby 
making it binding on every South African court, the Constitution is the supreme law of the 
country, and every court has to take into account the provisions of the Bill of Rights which is 
contained in the Constitution.290 As the restraint of trade clause limited the employee’s 
constitutional right to the freedom of trade, professions and occupation, it would be 
inconsistent with the Constitution to impose the burden of proof on the employee to prove 
that he had a constitutional right.291 The employer had the burden of proving that the 
employee had forfeited his constitutional right.292 The employer in addition to invoking the 
restraint of trade provision and proving that there was a breach of said provision, the 
employer had to prove that in terms of section 36 of the Constitution the restraint of trade 
provision was reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom.  
With regard to the issue of onus, the court in Magna Alloys held that the acceptance of the 
public policy criterion means that the party who alleges that he is not bound by a restraint of 
trade to which he had agreed to, bears the onus of proving that its enforcement would be 
contrary to public policy.293 The issue of onus is now settled. Where the onus lies in a 
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particular case is a consequence of the substantive law on the issue.294 The substantive law is 
the law which was laid down in Magna Alloys.295In determining whether a contract is 
contrary to public policy, constitutional values must be infused into the enquiry.296 In order 
for the employee’s onus to be discharged, he must put sufficient facts before the court.297 
The South African law on restraint of trade had been applied in terms of English and Roman-
Dutch law, and has also been influenced by the interim and final Constitutions. Some case 
law have preferred the common law approach, whilst others have stressed the constitutional 
aspects of restraint of trade.298 South African courts are dismissive of the suggestion that the 
constitutional dispensation required a revision of the restraint of trade law.299 
2.7 Constitutionality 
The principles which had been set out by the then Appellate Division in Magna Alloys were 
challenged in light of the provisions in the Bill of Rights as contained in the final 
Constitution.300 In Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a Fidelity Guards v Pearmain,301 the 
court had to decide on whether the Constitution had an effect on restraint of trade 
provisions.302 The court was requested to find that restraint of trade agreements were 
unconstitutional in terms of s 22 of the Constitution.303 
The court in arriving at its decision referred to a number of earlier cases which were decided 
under s 26 of the interim Constitution, where it was held that the principles304 which were set 
out by the Appellate Division in Magna Alloys was still good law.305 The court held that 
although the remarks which were made by the court in Knox D'Arcy Ltd and Another v Shaw 
and Another306were made with reference to s 26 of the interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993, 
they remained appropriate post the advent of the final Constitution,307 namely that the 
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Constitution does not interfere in the private affairs of individuals to the extent that it would, 
as matter of public policy protect them against their own foolhardy or rash decisions.308 
Provided that there is no superseding public policy principle which is isolated, the freedom of 
the person encapsulates the freedom to pursue, as he/she chooses his/her benefit or his/her 
disadvantage.309 The court went on to provide that it is generally regarded as immoral and 
dishonourable for a promisor to breach his trust, even where he does to escape the 
consequences of a poorly considered bargain, there is no principle in an open and democratic 
society which is based on freedom and equality which would justify him repudiating his 
obligations. The enforcement of a bargain, although unwise recognises the fundamental 
constitutional principle of the individual’s autonomy.310 The court further provided that 
insofar as a restraint limits the rights as contained in s 22 of the Constitution, the common 
law which was developed by the Coutts with regard to restraints of trade was of general 
application and complied with the s 36(1)311 requirements.312 Where a restraint clause is 
regarded as material, any party to any agreement is free to agree to include the clause in the 
agreement.313 In terms of the common law, restraint clauses are enforceable provided that 
they are not in conflict with public policy.314 Therefore, if a restraint clause is found to 
enforceable by the Courts, that is it is reasonable and not contrary to public policy, the 
requirements of s 36(1) will have been met.315 
3 CONCLUSION 
It is trite that restraint of trade agreements are valid and enforceable, except where the court 
can be convinced of its unenforceability. This is due to the Magna Alloys judgment, and 
subsequent cases. The enforceability of a restraint of trade is dependent on the person who is 
seeking the enforcement of the restraint, in almost all instances it is the employer, having a 
proprietary interest which justifies protection. Furthermore, the restraint must be reasonable 
and not contrary to public policy. The onus is on the employer to invoke the restraint and its 
breach and the employee must prove on a balance of probabilities that the restraint is 
unreasonable. The test for reasonableness was set out by the court in Basson. In addition to 
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the test, many other factors are taken into account. Public policy and constitutional values 
must always be considered by the court in determining the enforceability of a restraint. 
The next chapter will discuss the courts’ approach in adjudicating matters relating to restraint 
of trade prior to the landmark case of Magna Alloys as well as the judgment which was 























3 CHAPTER THREE 
In this chapter the courts’ approach in adjudicating matters relating to restraint of trade prior 
to the landmark case of Magna Alloys, as well as the judgment which was handed down in 
Magna Alloys will be discussed. 
1 INTRODUCTION   
Prior to the  decision of the Appellate Division (as it was known then) in Magna Alloys, the 
traditional approach which developed under the influence of English law and subsequently 
adopted by South African courts, was that contracts in restraint of trade were prima facie 
void, and therefore unenforceable.316 However, a restraint could be enforced if it was 
reasonable between the parties and not contrary to the public interest.317 A valid restraint was 
one which served some interest of the party in whose favour it had operated. Therefore, in the 
case of an employment relationship the interests that an employer could protect were his trade 
secrets and trade connections against exploitation by the employee.318 
The party who relied upon the restraint bore the onus of proving that it was reasonable.319 
This meant that the party had to provide proof that there were special circumstances which 
justified that the restraint provided no more than adequate protection to the covenantee.320  
The fact that the contracting parties had defined terms that they, in their opinion had regarded 
to be reasonable did not necessarily mean that the court would have also regarded those terms 
to be reasonable.321 It was the court’s duty to determine whether the restraint of trade was 
reasonable.322 The onus of proving that a restraint which was reasonable between the parties, 
but contrary to the public interest rested upon the person who alleged so.323 This onus was not 
a light one.324 
Where the restraint was agreed upon by parties who had contracted on equal terms, the courts 
tended to not interfere since the parties were regarded to be the best judges of what protection 
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was reasonable for their own interests.325 However, this did not constitute conclusive 
evidence of reasonableness. It has been held that a restraint of trade, which was agreed upon 
by parties who had contracted on equal terms, was invalid because it went further that 
reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the parties.326 When parties had contracted on 
an unequal footing, it was more difficult for the covenantee to discharge the onus of proving 
the restraint was reasonable in reference to the interests of the parties.327 The question of the 
equality of the parties was a question of fact and not of law, with each case being decided on 
its own facts.328 Employees are often, in relation their employers, in a position of economic 
inequality. However, competition amongst employers may be such that an employee may 
occupy a better bargaining position, while parties other than the employer and employee may 
be bargaining from an unequal position.329 
South African law, under the influence of English law favoured the freedom of trade over the 
sanctity of contracts.330 This was demonstrated in the rule that restraint of trade provisions 
were prima facie void, and unlike other contractual terms subject to the reasonableness 
test.331 The party seeking to enforce the restraint had to prove that it was reasonable between 
the parties.332 This meant that the restraint of trade must have been reasonably necessary to 
protect the specified interests of the party in whose favour the restraint had operated.333 This 
general approach addressed the frequent inequality in bargaining power in employment 
contracts, between the employer and employer, where the employee submitted to the 
restraint.334 
1.1 Controversy surrounding the traditional approach 
Prior to the Appellate Division’s decision in Magna Alloys, the question of whether English 
law governed the validity of restraint of trade had caused controversy.335 Numerous South 
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African courts had regarded English law and South African law to be identical336, while in 
other cases English law was considered to be of persuasive value.337 It was also submitted 
that the South African law required an evaluation, as the courts had failed to critically 
examine the historical origins of the English law.338 Furthermore, a few South African judges 
had expressed their reservations about whether the South African law on restraint of trade 
was the same as the English law.339 The courts had very seldom asked whence had the rules 
of restraint of trade come.340 On several occasions the traditional approach and rules were 
either rejected or questioned by the courts.341The court in Katz v Efthimiou stated that  the 
rule that contracts in restraint of trade were generally considered to be in conflict with public 
policy was absolutely foreign to the Roman and Roman-Dutch systems of law, and that 
considerable difficulty was experienced in locating the Roman-Dutch source of the traditional 
approach.342 Furthermore, Voet never had contracts in restraint of trade in mind.343 
Justification for the adoption of the English law could presumably be found in the Digest 
(35.1.71.2) and Voet (2.14.16).344 The court went on further to state that although, the rule 
which states that contracts in restraint of trade are contrary to public policy, it went against 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law, and had been embedded into the South African system of 
law.345 In SA Wire Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban Wire & Plastics (Pty) Ltd346 the court stated that 
there was uncertainty about whether South African courts were correct in applying the 
English law on restraint of trade. It was submitted that South African courts should not accept 
English law in its entirety, and that the judiciary by seeking guidance from other legal 
systems and without violating South African legal principles347 should develop the law on 
restraints of trade so that it was equitable, reflected the moral standards of the time and gave 
effect to both individuals and the public interest.348 
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Of particular significance were the cases of RoffeyvCatterall, Edwards & Goudré (Pty) 
Ltd,349 National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) LtdvBorrowman,350and Drewtons (Pty) LtdvCarlie.351  
Didcott, J in Roffey352 stated that the case in question had raised fundamental questions about 
some of the legal principles which had governed restraint of trade provisions in South 
Africa.353  Didcott, J enunciated a new approach on restraint of trade354 and held that not only 
was the sanctity of contract principle given preference in South African law, but that public 
policy in South Arica did not regard restraint of trade provisions as prima facie void, and that 
they were only contrary to public policy and unenforceable when they had been proved to be 
unreasonable.355 Didcott, J, despite the lack of Roman-Dutch authority on the issue accepted 
that regardless of what the law had generally stated about restraints of trade, restraint of trade 
provisions which unreasonably restrained trade were against public policy, and could not be 
enforced.356  He went on further to hold that the issue was not on whom the onus of proof 
laid, but rather what had to be proved. This depended on whether restraints of trade were 
primafacie void. 357 
The court held that contracts which were valid in form were primafacie enforceable in South 
African law, unless grounds for their avoidance could be proved.358Therefore, it followed 
from the ordinary South African contractual principles that restraint of trade provisions would 
be enforced, unless their unreasonableness was proved.359 
Although, the principle of sanctity of contract was in conflict with the principle of freedom of 
trade,360 the unqualified acceptance of one principle was impossible.361 The sanctity of 
contract principle was not only firmly entrenched in the South African system, but was also 
more commanding, and ‘vibrated’ more strongly in the South African jurisprudence than the 
freedom of trade.362 The public were more interested in the preservation of loyalty to 
contracts and the freedom to bargain, however a moral dimension was also involved, which 
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gave the sanctity of contract principle universality and durability.363 This moral dimension 
consisted of the requirement that people should keep their promises, and this transcended all 
else.364 
Didcott, J went on to consider whether restraint of trade provisions were ordinarily void.365 
English law, Roman-Dutch law and South African law provided that agreements which 
infringed public policy were unenforceable.366  However, while South African law followed 
English law on the issue of restraints of trade; that is restraints of trade were generally 
regarded to be contrary to public policy, Roman-Dutch authorities did not consider restraint 
of trade agreements to be contrary to public policy.367 When South African courts imitated 
the English law on restraint of trade, a South African ‘cult’368 was developed.369 However, it 
was questioned, and the imitation was not entirely uniform.370 
Didcott, J held that restraint of trade provisions were not primafacievoid, and that public 
policy in South Africa did not generally condemn restraint of trade provisions.  Furthermore, 
unreasonable restraint of trade provisions were contrary to public policy and 
unenforceable.371 Didcott, J relied on the judgment of Bale, C.J in South African Breweries 
Ltd.vMuriel,372 in which Bale, C.J held that the public policy endorsed the sanctity of 
contracts more certainly than any other favouring freedom of trade.373 Didcott, J further 
overruled the decision of the Full Bench in Durban Rickshas Ltd. vBall,374 because the 
honourable judge deemed the latter decision to be incorrect, even though the decision was 
binding on the court.375 Didcott, J furnished three reasons for his decision.  
First, Matthews, A.J.P. applied the law that was applied in English case law, as well as some 
South African case law which had followed the English decisions. Although, Matthews, 
A.J.P.’s judgment had stood for more than 40 years, overruling it would not have disturbed 










372 1905 (26) N.L.R. 362, 367-368. 
373Roffey (note 349 above) 506C-D. 





arrangements which were made in reliance on it which concerned the court.376 Secondly, 
most covenanters when agreeing to restraint of trade provisions presumably intended to 
observe them, and no special allowance was given to those who do not observe the 
restraint.377 Thirdly, judicial precedent did not enjoy much force when public policy was in 
issue, meaning that decisions which are based upon public policy do not possess the same 
binding authority as decisions which formulate legal principles.378 Additionally, the rule of 
policy should be determined with near accuracy for the current or present time period.379 
In National Chemsearch380 the court held that the appeal had raised a number of problems 
relating to the enforcement of restraint of trade agreements.381  The court held that there was 
a difference between the personal opinion of a Judge and the law on a particular subject.382 
Botha, J held that it was of no consequence that that there was no Roman-Dutch source which 
provided that restraint of trade agreements were, or could be contrary to public policy, and 
that the views of old authorities on what type of agreement was contrary to public policy was 
not necessarily  binding in modern times.383 Botha, J in his opinion, thought that the sanctity 
of contracts should have taken preference over the freedom of trade, and was in agreement 
with Didcott, J’s reasoning on this view.384 However, Botha, J did not share Didcott, J’s 
conclusion that in terms of South African public policy restraint of trade provisions were not 
prima facie void.385  Botha, J held that Didcott, J’s decision had not only produced startling 
and questionable results386, but also that judicial precedent which went more than fifty years 
back, and in which eminent Judges consistently applied the same principles with regard to 
public policy could not be ignored as was done by Didcott, J,387 even if they were criticised 
for their uncritical adoption of English law principles.388 Botha, J was of the opinion that on 
the question of which principle should take precedence, there was room for legitimate 
differences of opinion.389 


















Roffey390 was a provincial decision, and according to Botha, J did not have the function of 
departing from a binding decision that was considered to be wrong by Didcott, J with 
conviction. This was the function of the Appellate Division.391 
Botha,J went to provide that South African courts were not obliged to apply all the English 
rule and principles relating to the enforceability of restraint of trade agreements. The English 
law was open to scrutiny and two questions could be asked: to what extent was English law 
already followed in South African law, and secondly on its merits, whether it deserved to be 
followed.392 
2 MAGNA ALLOYS: THE LANDMARK CASE  
Restraint of trade cases rarely reach the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), because by the time 
an application is made for an urgent interdict in order to enforce the restraint, the period for 
which the restraint of trade provision would operate for,would have lapsed by the time the 
matter reached the courts.393 At the time that the Magna Alloys case was heard in the 
Appellate Division, more than five years had lapsed since the end of the restraint period.394 It 
was only the claim for damages and the substantial amount of legal costs which had kept the 
matter alive.395 
The Magna Alloys case is important because it was heard in the Appellate Division, and has 
been referred to as a landmark decision396 as it changed the law on restraint of trade.397 The 
court’s decision introduced a significant change to the approach that was adopted by courts 
before it with regard to matters relating to restraint of trade, by declining to follow earlier 
decisions.398 It held that restraint of trade provisions are valid and enforceable and should be 
honoured except where they unreasonably restrict a person’s right to trade or work and are in 
conflict with s 22 of the Constitution. Magna Alloys remains as the leading case on restraints 
in South Africa.399 
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The Appellate Division in Magna Alloys held that numerous South African courts, in 
deciding on the enforceability of a restraint of trade applied a law which the common law that 
is the Roman-Dutch had not provided for.400 The Roman-Dutch law had not provided that 
restraints of trade were prohibited.401 Rather, the English law on restraints of trade was 
applied.402 The English law provided for two rules. The first being that restraint of trade 
provisions were prima facie invalid, and that the party who sought to enforce the restraint had 
to prove that it was reasonable in reference to the parties.403 The second provided that the 
party who alleged that the restraint was against public policy bore the onus of proving so.404 
The Appellate Division held that every restraint agreement which is signed by a restrainee is 
prima facie enforceable, and that where the restrainee wishes not to be restrained, he/she 
bears the onus to prove that the restraint is unreasonable, and contrary to public policy.405 A 
court in determining whether the restraint is contrary to public policy, will consider the facts 
and circumstances which existed at the time that the restrainor attempts to enforce the 
restraint agreement and will balance two key considerations.406 The first is that public policy 
requires that parties comply with their contractual obligations even if they are unreasonable 
or unfair. This is the pacta sunt servanda maxim.407 Secondly, all persons should in the 
interest of society be permitted as far as possible to freely engage in commerce or the 
profession freely.408 
The court went on further to hold that pacta sunt servanda should predominate.409 It was in 
the public interest that everyone should, as far as possible be able to freely operate in the 
commercial and professional world, and that agreements which were freely entered into be 
honoured.410 In South African law, agreements which were contrary to the public interest 
were unenforceable.411 
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Furthermore, the enforceability of a restraint of trade was determined by asking whether its 
enforcement would prejudice the public interest.412 Therefore, having regard to the 
circumstances of a particular case, a restraint of trade provision would be unenforceable if its 
enforcement would be contrary to the public interest.413 If a person was bound to an 
unreasonable restraint of trade, the public interest would probably be prejudiced.414 It was 
ultimately on the ground of public policy that the restraint was examined in order to 
determine a restraint’s enforceability and its unreasonableness.415 However, what constitutes 
the public policy is apt to change and changes according to the changing face of 
commerce.416 It must always be asked: is it in the interest of the community that the restraint 
be held reasonable and enforceable.417 
The acceptance of the view that the enforceability of a restraint of trade was dependent on 
whether its enforcement would prejudice the public interest resulted in the following 
consequences: 
i. the party who alleged that he was not bound by the restraint of trade, bore the onus of 
proving that the enforcement of the restraint was contrary to the public interest; 
ii. the court had to consider the circumstances that existed at the time that the 
enforcement was sought and;  
iii. the court could declare a part of the restraint to be enforceable or unenforceable, and 
was not limited to finding if the restraint as a whole was enforceable or 
unenforceable.418 
There had been debate about whether the appellate division had approved the traditional 
approach to restraint of trade in cases such as Van der Pol v Silbermann.419 The Appellate 
Division held that the case did not constitute a binding precedent, as the Appellate Division 
had assumed that South African law had corresponded to English law.420 Although the 
Appellate Division had overruled the decisions of provincial courts which had applied the 
traditional doctrine, they were regarded to be of importance as they had indicated that for 
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many decades, South African courts were of the view that it was in the public interest that 
everyone should, as far as possible be able to operate freely in the commercial and 
professional world, and that an unreasonable restraint upon this freedom, or a restraint 
prejudicial to the public interest should not be allowed.421 
2.1 Issues that arose out of the Appellate Division’s decision 
The Appellate Division had resolved some of the controversial issues surrounding restraint of 
trade, but simultaneously left a number of crucial questions unanswered.422 Although new 
guidelines were laid down, the practical implications of many of them were uncertain.423 
Insufficient attention was also paid to the theoretical and practical implications of the new 
guidelines.424 The foundation of the court’s decision was comprised of judgments that were 
pronounced by the provincial courts in the cases of Roffey425, Chemsearch and Drewtons.426 
However, this was problematic because the judgments had differed from each other in 
important aspects, and the Appellate Division did not clarify which case’s approach it had 
favoured.427 
 The court followed the judgment in Drewtons428case when it was held that a restraint of 
trade was never invalid or void. It may only be unenforceable.429 Enforceability was not 
explicitly tested against the covenantee’s traditional proprietary or commercial 
interests.430Roffey431 and Chemsearch were followed when the Appellate Division attached 
considerable weight to the question of whether the restraint in question was reasonable.432 On 
the issue of partial enforcement of a restraint, both Chemsearch and Drewtons433 were 
followed.434 While both Chemsearch435 and Drewtons did not utilise the traditional approach 
relating to severability, Chemsearch added qualifications which were absent in Drewtons.436 
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The Appellate Division did not provide a convincing explanation of why the sanctity of 
contract was preferred over the freedom of trade.437 A general discussion was provided, and 
no mention was made of the role that is played by specific economic interests for example, 
the protectable interest of the covenantee in justifying restraints.438 It is interests like these 
which are at the core of restraints of trade.439 Furthermore, no mention was made of the 
possible unequal bargaining power between employers and employees.440 The Appellate 
Division, in order to make a logical decision, changed specific rules relating to restraints, 
especially the rule governing onus and preferred the sanctity of contract.441 As a result, the 
role of economic interests was not addressed.442 However, the traditional doctrine addressed 
this issue, by requiring that restraints of trade provisions went no further than to protect the 
defined proprietary and commercial interests of the covenantee.443 The possible inequality of 
the bargaining power between the employer and employee assisted in shaping the traditional 
rules relating to reasonableness and onus.444 In changing these rules, the Appellate Division 
paid no attention to this component of the traditional doctrine.445 
While the Appellate Division emphasised the reasonableness test, the court did not analyse 
and rule upon the way in which our courts had over the years applied the reasonableness test, 
and had given it a definite content by coupling it with the covenantee’s protectable interest.446 
Moreover, the Appellate Division had not provided clarity on whether the lower courts 
should have followed the English law, or should have adopted the approach taken by the 
court in Roffey.447 
The Appellate Division held that the reasonableness of the restraint of trade provision was to 
be determined between the parties, and with reference to the covenantee’s protectable 
interest.448 While reasonableness was still relevant, the test for enforceability was whether the 
public interest was prejudiced.449 The traditional doctrine’s two prong test,that is 
reasonableness between the parties or prejudice to the public interest was replaced by the 
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single test of whether the public interest would be prejudiced.450 It was submitted that this 
was to pose problems in the matters that came to the courts after the Appellate Division’s 
decision.451 
3 CONCLUSION 
The decision of Magna Alloys that a restraint of trade clause is generally enforceable, means 
that it must be treated in the way as any other contractual provision involving private 
parties.452 A restraint which is contrary to public policy is unenforceable. Public policy 
represents the legal convictions of the community and the values which are held most dear by 
society,453 and is deeply rooted in the Constitution and in the values which underlie it.454 In 
determining what constitutes public policy, and whether a contractual provision is contrary to 
public policy reference must be made to the values which underlie our constitutional 
democracy.455 As a result, contractual provisions which are contrary to the values which are 
protected in the Constitution are contrary to public policy, and unenforceable.456 
Chapter four will focus on garden leave provisions, as they are a new aspect of restraint of 
trade which has not been considered by South African courts prior to February 2016. The 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of garden leave primarily originates from English law, and forms part of an 
employee’s employment contract.458 Employers in England had no assurance that a court will 
enforce a restraint of trade provision, thereby preventing key employees from working for a 
competitor despite the inclusion of restraint of trade clauses in their employees employment 
contracts, a variation of a restraint of trade clause called garden leave was developed, and it 
proved to be an effective solution to the uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of restraint 
of trade clauses.459 
The 1987 appeal case of Evening Standard Co.v Henderson460 gave rise to the concept of 
garden leave. The law provided that if one party to a contract of service repudiated the 
contract but the other party did not accept it, the contract will remain in existence.461 The 
employee had repudiated his employment contract and the employer had not accepted the 
repudiation.462 The court enforced what was previously regarded as an unenforceable restraint 
of trade clause, because the employer undertook to pay the employee’s salary for the period 
of the restraint.463 The court’s decision brought about a drastic change in English employment 
law.464 
It was in Provident Financial Groupv Hayward 465that the court examined a garden leave 
clause.466 The employee’s employment contract provided that he had to furnish the employer 
with one year’s prior notice before terminating his employment contract, and also provided 
that the employer could exclude the former employee from the employment premises as well 
as the employer could suspend him from his duties at any time, but that the employee would 
receive his full salary and benefits during the notice period.467 The court held that it was this 
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expression which was colloquially known was garden leave.468 The case was regarded to 
have wider importance because garden leave clauses are imposed on many senior executives 
and it may be that these executives are hardly in a positon to negotiate over the terms of their 
contracts of service.469 However, the court expressed concern about employers restraining 
employees from accepting alternative employment by simply paying the employee his full 
salary.470 The court held that long periods of garden leave were capable of abuse, as it is a 
weapon that employers can utilise to ensure that an employee does not tender notice of his 
termination of his employment contract, if he will be unable to work for someone else for a 
long period of time.471 Any executive who gives notice and leaves his place of employment 
will likely find work in the same line of business that his former employer was engaged, not 
to cheat the employer, but to get the best advantage of his own personal expertise.472 A wide 
clause prohibiting the employee from working for anyone else would not be enforced, even if 
the employee is offered full pay, if it appears that the other business for which the employee 
wishes to work for before the expiration of his notice has nothing to do with the employer’s 
business.473 The court recognised and implicitly approved the use of garden leave clauses to 
prevent an employee from being employed by a competitor in a similar position.474 
2 GARDEN LEAVE PROVISIONS 
A garden leave or sterilisation clause is commonly incorporated into senior executives’475 
employment contracts, and arises when an employee terminates his/her employment contract 
so that he/she can work for a competitor, or when the employer terminates the employee’s 
employment contract.476Employers, especially in the financial sector have been increasingly 
incorporating garden leave clauses into their employees’ contracts.477 
It requires the employee to furnish the employer with a specific and reasonably long period of 
notice478 before terminating his employment contract,479 and provides that while the 
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employee is serving his/her notice period, he/she will not be able to undertake his/her normal 
duties,480but he/she must remain accessible to the employer.481 
 The employer promises to not sue the employee for damages, as a result of the employee’s 
failure to fulfil his duties under the employment contract.482 Furthermore, the employer may 
not force the employee to do any work,483 and the employee will be paid his/her full salary 
and benefits.484 Additionally, as the employee remains an ‘employee’ of the employer, he 
cannot work for a competitor485 nor do anything to harm the employer.486 
The reason for the incorporation of such a clause is that it allows the employee’s possible 
successor time to become established,487 and by the time the employee re-enters the job 
market, the employee’s use of his full knowledge and skill will not pose a threat to the former 
employer’s business,488 as during the long notice period the employee would have not had 
access to the employer’s confidential information, and the confidential information which he 
already had would have become obsolete or less valuable to competitors once he enters the 
job market again.489 Furthermore, the long notice period may make the employee less 
attractive to a competitor who requires an employee to begin work immediately, and 
therefore the competitor may be deterred from hiring the employee.490 
 Courts are more likely to permit an employer to dictate the actions of an employee rather 
than a former employee.491 Garden leave clauses have provided employers with the 
protection that they require, is fair to employees, and have been generally more readily 
accepted and enforced by the English courts, compared to the traditional restraint of trade 
clauses.492 They have become widely utilised.493 Many American employers have begun 
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inserting garden leave provisions into the employment contracts of their key employees in the 
hopes that they would be enforced.494 
2.1 Origin of the ‘garden leave’ name 
The clause is called garden leave, because it was assumed that the notice period in which the 
employee was not required to undertake his normal duties at his place of employment, he 
would be at home working in his garden while being financially secure.495 
2.2 Enforceability 
The enforceability of a garden leave provision is dependent on whether the employer has a 
proprietary interest to protect.496 An element of the proprietary interest is the money that is 
made available to the departing employee during his former employment.497 A garden leave 
provision will be not be enforceable if it is geographically too wide, or the period of the 
restraint is too long, even where the employee is paid his full salary and benefits during his 
notice period.498 
2.3 Similarities and differences between garden leave and restraint of trade 
Garden leave is similar to a restraint of trade, as they both require an employee not to work 
for a rival trader, or in a business which is similar to the employee’s former employer for a 
specified period of time.499 Furthermore, it has the same effect as a restraint of trade clause, 
because it stifles competition, and reduces the risk of the usage or disclosure of trade 
secrets.500 
A garden leave clause takes effect prior to the termination of the employee’s employment 
contract, because although the employee serves notice on the employer or vice versa and the 
contract terminates at a future date, the employee will be nevertheless will serve out his 
notice,501 while a restraint of trade clause takes effect after the termination of the employee’s 
employment contract. Furthermore, the essential difference between garden leave and 
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restraint of trade clauses is that during garden leave the employee is not only paid during the 
notice period, but that /she remains an employee of his former employer.502 
2.4 Arguments and issues raised in respect of garden leave 
There are several arguments which arise in respect of the enforceability or otherwise of 
garden leave. In terms of the forced starvation argument, if the employee is not paid his/her 
salary and benefits during the notice period by the employer, the employee can argue that as a 
result of him starving, the garden leave clause should not be enforced.503 However, the 
employer can argue that although the employee’s standard of living may be severely reduced, 
the employee will not starve due to the country’s welfare system.504 A more compelling 
argument may be that the employee has been reduced to idleness, and as a result has no duties 
to perform, and cannot exercise his skills.505 An issue which arises is whether an employer 
can lawfully prevent an employee from working, and whether an employee has an implied 
right to work.506 If the implied right is based on the contract, there is no reason why the right 
should not be expressly excluded.507 However, in terms of public policy, each individual has 
a right to work, and therefore, the garden leave clause may be void.508 
If the garden leave in question is enforced, the employer’s bargaining power is increased 
when confronted by an employee who wishes to leave, and whose future career may be in 
jeopardy.509 The courts had considered damages to be an inadequate remedy for breach of 
garden leave.510 The longer the notice period that an employee has to serve, the less is the 
chance of the court enforcing the garden leave.511 Only a portion of the notice period will be 
enforced by a court, where the entire notice period is not necessary for the employer’s 
protection.512 
In practice, the notice periods for both parties are usually the same.513 Longer notice periods 
tend to favour the employee, because if his employment contracted is terminated he will 
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receive compensation.514 If an employer wishes to retain the services of a valuable employee, 
a longer notice period may be accepted, whereas an ambitious employee may require a 
shorter notice period in the event that a better employment opportunity for him arises, and he 
wishes to take up the employment as soon as possible.515 However, a relatively short notice 
period is desirable in the interests of the employer to ensure the clause is enforceable as well 
as reducing compensation in the event of termination.516 A garden leave clause can also be a 
relevant factor in determining the enforceability of a restraint of trade clause.517 
3 GARDEN LEAVE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
In the recent case of Vodacom518the court had to consider the effect that a garden leave 
provision had on the enforceability of a restraint of trade. Garden leave provisions had not 
been considered by our courts before February 2016.  
3.1 Facts 
Godfrey Motsa,519 a senior executive employee commenced employment with Vodacom520 
on 8 January 2007. He was also a director of Vodacom, a member of its exco, and chief 
officer of the consumer business unit.521 During October 2015 he tendered his resignation 
from Vodacom’s employ after informing the CEO Shameel Joosub522 that he had received an 
employment offer from MTN.523 However, he withdrew his resignation upon the 
improvement of his remuneration package.524 On 22 December 2015, Vodacom became 
aware that MTN had communicated to its senior employees that Motsa was to be appointed 
as its vice-president for the SEA region which included Southern Africa.525 On 23 December 
2015 Motsa resigned,526 after informing Joosub on the same day that although he was 
considering an employment offer from MTN he had not accepted it.527 
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Vodacom brought an urgent application to court, seeking a final order to hold Motsa to a 
notice period of six months (garden leave), and after the expiry of the notice period to a 
further six months restraint undertaking.528 Vodacom argued that Motsa’s failure to give the 
required notice resulted in him breaching the employment contract. Motsa argued that he was 
bound only by the restraint undertaking, and not the notice period because Vodacom elected 
not to hold him to his notice period on 23 December 2015 by paying him in lieu of the notice 
period, and as a result his employment terminated immediately.529 He further argued that the 
restraint undertaking became operative on 23 December 2015. Moreover, he argued that he 
could not be restrained for a further six months beyond the expiry of his notice period 
because the useful life of the confidential information which he had access to, was six 
months. Therefore, an enforcement of the restraint beyond six months would be 
unreasonable.530 
Clause 16 and 18 of Motsa’s employment contract regulated the termination of his 
employment and restraint of trade obligations respectively. Clause 16 provided that: 
i. termination of the employment contract will occur when either party furnishes the 
other party with a no less than six months’ prior written notice; 
ii. Vodacom in its sole and absolute discretion and for any reason whatsoever can 
require him not to work or attend to his ordinary employment related duties and 
responsibilities during his notice period. However, he will be required to be available 
during the period to assist Vodacom, and at the request of Vodacom provide a 
seamless transition of his responsibilities; 
iii. he will not, during the notice period have any contact with customers or clients of 
Vodacom without prior written consent from Vodacom and; 
iv. where a no less than six months’ prior written notice has been furnished, he will be 
required to work in that notice period, except where Vodacom pays him in lieu of the 
notice.531 
Clause 18 dealt with restraint of trade obligations which the parties agreed to. It provided that 
six months after the date on which Motsa’s employment terminates, he is restrained from 
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being employed or otherwise engaged in the business of any competitor within the Southern 
and parts of East and West Africa.532 
3.2 Issues 
The issues that the court had to consider were as follows: 
i. the relationship, if any between a garden leave provision and a restraint undertaking; 
ii. if Motsa was obligated to serve a notice period; 
iii. whether the six month notice clause was against public policy, unreasonable and 
unenforceable; 
iv. the date on which the restraint undertaking would operate;  
v. whether the enforcement of the restraint beyond six months would be unreasonable. 
vi. whether Motsa is bound to both the notice period and restraint undertaking, or just the 
restraint undertaking; and 
vii. whether any period of enforced commercial inactivity either by way of a garden leave 
provision or restraint of trade, or both is unreasonable after having regard to the 
proprietary interest that the employer seeks to protect. 
The court in Sihlali v South African Broadcasting Corporation533 held that resignation is a 
unilateral act.534 In Massmart Holdings v Vera & another535 it was held that a restraint 
agreement (restraint) is enforceable provided that it is reasonable.536 A reasonable restraint is 
one which protects some proprietary interest of the party seeking its enforcement.537 The 
party seeking the enforcement of the restraint is required to invoke the restraint and prove 
that there has been a breach. The party seeking to avoid the restraint bears the onus of 
proving on proving on a balance of probabilities that the restraint is unenforceable because it 
is unreasonable.538 
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The test for determining the reasonableness of a restraint was set out by the court in Basson v 
Chilwan,539 and is regarded as one the most influential statements of law.540 The test 
comprises of four questions: 
i. Is there one party who has an interest deserving of protection at the termination of the 
agreement? 
ii. Is such interest being prejudiced by the other party? 
iii. If so, does such interest weigh up qualitatively and quantitatively against the interests 
of the latter party that the latter party should not be economically inactive and 
unproductive?, and 
iv. Is there another facet of public policy having nothing to do with the relationship 
between the parties but which requires that the restraint should either be maintained or 
rejected?541 
3.3 Judgment 
Before February 2016, the concept of garden leave and its relationship, if any with a restraint 
had not been considered by the South African Labour Courts.542 A garden leave clause 
provides that where an employee gives notice of the termination of his employment, the 
employer may require the employee to spend either the entirety or a part of the notice period 
not working, thereby allowing the confidential information which the employee had access 
to, to become stale and simultaneously the employee is kept out of a competitor’s clutches.543 
As a result, and as an advantage to the employer, the employee is commercially inactive and 
no risk of the reasonableness of the restraint undertaking would be attracted.544  However, the 
employee is entitled to remuneration during the garden leave period, and the employee must 
be available to the employer, should the employer require his assistance.  
Section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court 
may consider foreign law. The court considered a number of foreign authorities which dealt 
with the relationship between a garden leave and a restraint.545 
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In William Hill Organisation v Tucker546the court held that in order for a garden leave 
provision to be enforced, the provision must be justified on similar grounds to those that are 
necessary to prove the validity of a restraint, and a garden leave provision must not be 
enforced to any greater extent than would be covered by a justifiable restraint previously 
entered into by an employee.547 Furthermore, employers are increasingly relying on garden 
leave provisions compared to conventional restraint provisions, because the courts have 
treated garden leave provisions with greater flexibility than restraint provisions.548 Moreover, 
where the contract to which the employer is bound, obligates the employer to permit the 
employee to perform the duties of the post to which he was appointed in accordance with his 
contract and during the period of his notice before it was given, the employer must expressly 
provide for a garden leave provision in the employee’s employment contract.549 
The Court of Appeal in Credit Suisse v Armstrong550 held that ordinarily there is no 
relationship between a restraint and a garden leave provision. If a restraint was valid, the 
employer was entitled to enforce it. Where the garden leave provision is in excess of one 
year, a court may not enforce a further protection in terms of a restraint. The court upheld the 
post termination restraint even though the employee had already served a six months garden 
leave.551 
In Tullett Prebon plc v BGC Brokers LP552it was held that a court has a discretion in deciding 
whether to enforce a post termination restraint when a garden leave provision has already 
been enforced, and that where a garden leave provision has been enforced the court will 
decline to enforce a post termination restraint as the employer would have received all the 
protection that he was entitled to. In exercising its discretion the court will take into account 
the period for which the employer is entitled to protection, and whether he employer is 
entitled to protection for a period beyond that which is made available for in a garden leave 
provision. The court will exercise its discretion when considering the period for which to 
enforce a restraint, provided that the restraint is reasonable. 
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The New Zealand Employment Court in the case of Air New Zealand v Grant Kerr553held 
that a garden leave provision should be taken into account by the court when considering the 
reasonableness of the duration of any post termination restraint.554 
After consideringthe foreign cases, the court saw ‘no reason to adopt a different approach.’555 
The court held that in determining the reasonableness of the duration of a restraint, ‘the full 
period that an employee is out of the market should be taken into account’,556 and that any 
period of enforced commercial inactivity prior to the termination of employment is relevant 
in determining the reasonableness of post termination restraint.557 The court went on further 
to state that this position is consistent with the broader public interest which is against 
experienced and competent employees being inactive and their skills being wasted during an 
unreasonably long absence from commercial activity.558 The reason why highly paid 
executives command such lucrative remuneration packages is because of the restraint and 
other ‘golden handcuff clauses’ that are inserted into their employment contracts, and is a 
factor that should be taken into account when determining the reasonableness of a post 
termination restraint period. Public policy considerations and the employee’s right to exercise 
his/her skills need to also be taken into account by the courts. 
3.1.1 If Motsa was obligated to serve a notice period 
In determining if Motsa was obligated to serve a notice period, the court considered whether 
or not Vodacom had waived its rights by not requiring Motsa to work out his notice period.559 
In determining if Vodacom had elected to pay Motsa in lieu of the notice, the court 
objectively assessed the wording of the communique between Vodacom and Motsa,560 and 
Motsa’s resignation against the fact that he was reminded by Joosub, Nyoka and Mbungela 
that the termination of his employment contract was subject to a six month notice clause and 
a six month restraint and that Vodacom could elect whether or not to enforce these 
provisions.561 
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Clause 16 of Motsa’s employment contract provided Vodacom with three options with regard 
to the notice period:562 
i. Motsa would work out the notice period and be paid; 
ii. in terms of the garden leave provision, Motsa would be paid to remain at home but 
remain available to assist Vodacom and provide a seamless transition of his 
responsibilities; and 
iii. Vodacom would pay Motsa in lieu of the notice resulting in the immediate 
termination of Motsa’s employment contract and Motsa would have been entitled to 
the remuneration that he would have earned during the notice period. 
Motsa relied on the email communication which was sent by Vodacom on 24 December 
2015, and which stated that Motsa was leaving Vodacom with ‘immediate effect’ to prove 
that Vodacom paid him in lieu of the notice. However the email did not state that Vodacom 
did so.563 Motsa also engaged in two telephone conversations with Joosub and Nyoka on 23 
December 2015, in terms of which Joosub outlined the options that Vodacom, had available 
to it, and Nyoka informed Motsa that if he were to resign and take up employment with a 
competitor, Vodacom would enforce both the notice period and garden leave provision.564 
Despite Nyoka’s advice, Motsa resigned, and intended to join MTN, Vodacom’s largest 
competitor.565 
Motsa admitted that his only concern, at the time that he read the communique which was 
issued by Vodacom on 24 December 2015 was for his reputation. The court held that this 
concern was inconsistent with his belief that Vodacom had elected to pay him in lieu of the 
notice.566 
Motsa failed to establish that Vodacom waived its rights to enforce the notice period as he 
was unable to point to a single meeting, telephone conversation or item of correspondence, 
after he had received advice on the options that were available to Vodacom should he resign 
which indicated that Vodacom had released him from his notice period or that Vodacom had 
paid him in lieu of the notice.567 Furthermore, the words ‘immediate effect’ did not 
unequivocally state that Motsa would be leaving the employ of Vodacom with immediate 
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effect or that Vodacom would pay him in lieu of the notice. Moreover, the words ‘with 
immediate effect’ are a public relations response that is used by corporations on the 
resignation of their employees.568 
The six month notice clause was not against public policy, not unreasonable nor 
unenforceable as the wording of the clause intended to render Motsa commercially inactive 
for six months, and Motsa was aware of what he was signing when he entered into the 
employment contract.569 Motsa was therefore bound to the notice clause which terminated on 
30 June 2016.570 
3.1.2 Motsa’s restraint undertakings 
Motsa’s restraint undertakings were assessed in accordance with the principle that restraint 
undertakings should include the garden leave period.571 The intention of a garden leave clause 
is to sterilise the employee, and during garden leave period Motsa would: be prohibited from 
having contact with Vodacom’s customers and clients, and not be able to have access to 
Vodacom’s trade secrets, and any trade connections which may be of value to MTN.572 
As Motsa was a senior executive, a director, chief officer of the consumer business unit and a 
member of Vodacom’s exco, he had intimate knowledge of: strategic: business decisions on a 
micro-level; decisions taken and instructions issued by the exco in respect of Vodacom’s 
South African business; and plans that covered every aspect of Vodacom’s business for the 
forthcoming three years.573 This information would be of benefit to a competitor. The court 
held that on this basis alone, and the useful life of the information to which Motsa was 
exposed, a restraint period which spanned a 12 month period following Motsa’s resignation 
was not unreasonable.574 Therefore Motsa’s employment terminated on 30 June 2016 and the 
restraint undertaking would operate from 1 July 2016 until 31 December 2016, and he had to 
pay the applicant’s costs as well as the costs of senior counsel. 
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This decision of the Labour Court sets a precedent, because the Labour Courts in South 
Africa have up until now not had an opportunity to consider garden leave clauses and their 
impact, if any on restraints. The judgement is an indication of the significance and weight 
that the court will place on information which employees have intimate knowledge, and are 
in possession of upon their resignation. The case also highlights the importance of an 
employee being able to prove his/her defence. Motsa was unable to prove any of his claims 
and as a result failed in his defence. The finding of the court might have been different if he 
was able to prove his claim. The court’s finding also serves as a warning to employers who 
wish to enforce both garden leave and restraint clauses, in that if both clauses put together 
results in the employee being on the side-lines for longer than is reasonably necessary to 
protect the employer’s proprietary interests, the restraint may be found to unreasonable and 
unenforceable.575 
5CONCLUSION 
Garden leave provisions are a new concept in South African law and are not provided for in 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997.576 They are a desirable risk mitigating 
measure for employers as employees in high executive positions will continue to be head-
hunted by competitors’ even after a significant period of commercial inactivity.577 However, 
the honourable Judge Van Niekerk stressed that when employers include garden leave 
provisions into employment contracts, consideration must be given to the length of the 
provision, and that the broader public policy requires that skilled and experienced employees 
not be commercially inactive for a lengthy period of time as the consequence could be that 
their trade abilities will be of no benefit to themselves or their employers.578 
While every citizen has the constitutional right to choose and practise their profession, trade 
or occupation freely, this right is not unfettered, and can be regulated by the law on restraint 
of trade. It is trite that restraint of trade agreements are valid and enforceable, except where 
the courts can be convinced of its unenforceability. This law arose out of the landmark 
decision of the then Appellate Division in theMagna Alloys case, which has been approved 
                                                          
575  L Frahm-Arp ‘Garden leave and restraint of trade agreements – can garden leave be an effective substitute 
for a restraint undertakings or can it cause the restraint undertaking to be unenforceable?’ available at 
http://www.fasken.com/garden-leave-and-restraint-of-trade/, accessed on 16 April 2016. 
576Moiloa (note 458 above). 
577 Ibid. 




by the courts in subsequent cases, especially the Supreme Court of Appeal. A consequence of 
the then Appellate Division’s decision is that restraint of trade provisions must be treated in 
the same way as any other contractual provision involving private parties. 
The enforceability of a restraint of trade provision is dependent on the person who is seeking 
the enforcement of the restraint,having a proprietary interest which justifies protection. In 
almost all instances this person is the employer. Furthermore, the restraint must be reasonable 
and not contrary to public policy. The onus is on the employer to invoke the restraint and its 
breach and the employee must prove on a balance of probabilities that the restraint is 
unreasonable. The test for reasonableness was set out by the court in Basson and has been 
regarded as one of the most influential statements of law. In addition to this test, many other 
factors are taken into account. Public policy and constitutional values must always be 
considered by the courts in determining the enforceability of a restraint. 
A restraint which is contrary to public policy is unenforceable. Public policy represents the 
legal convictions of the community and the values which are held most dear by society. It is 
deeply rooted in the Constitution and in the values which underlie it. In determining what 
constitutes public policy, and whether a contractual provision is contrary to public policy 
reference must be made to the values which underlie our constitutional democracy. As a 
result, contractual provisions which are contrary to the values that are protected by the 
Constitution are contrary to public policy, and unenforceable.  
Garden leave provisions are a new concept in South African law and are not provided for in 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. They are a desirable risk mitigating 
measure for employers as employees in high executive positions will continue to be head-
hunted by competitors’ even after a significant period of commercial inactivity. The decision 
of the Labour Court in terms of garden leave sets a precedent, because the Labour Courts in 
South Africa before February 2016 had not had an opportunity to consider garden leave 
clauses and their impact, if any on restraints. The judgment serves as a warning to employers 
who wish to enforce both garden leave and restraint clauses, in that if both clauses put 
together results in the employee being on the side-lines for longer than is reasonably 
necessary to protect the employer’s proprietary interests, the restraint may be found to 
unreasonable and unenforceable. Garden leave is an innovation which would soon be 
adjudicated by the courts throughout South Africa due to the additional protection it affords 
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